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Legislative Comment
POLICY DEATH BY ADMINISTRATIVE
RESTRICTION: THE HOUSE COMMITTEE'S
REPORT ON BILL C-42, THE COMPETITION ACT
OF 1977
By M. T. MAcCRIMMON*
and
W. T. STANBURY-1
A. INTRODUCTION
It is said that an entrant to the Queen's Plate designed by a Parliamen-
tary Committee would be a two-humped camel. The House of Commons
Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs in its report
on Bill C-421 (the proposed Competition Act2) has produced a set of en-
forcement procedures for Canadian competition policy less well-designed for
that purpose than a camel for the Plate. The Committee, apparently in
sympathy with the overwhelming representations of the business community,
has chosen to all but destroy the potential value of Bill C-42, not by severely
weakening the substantive sections dealing with mergers, monopoly, joint
monopolization, price discrimination and class actions, but by recommending
administrative procedures which will all but ensure that the enlarged civil
provisions of the Act have little impact. The procedures are more complicated
than the wilder versions of Rube Goldberg's marvelous machines. They will
have the same effect - much motion, many inter-connections and no useful
output.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and to analyze the impact of
the Committee's recommendations in respect to the procedures by which the
©Copyright, 1977, M. T. MacCrimmon and W. T. Stanbury. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the prompt and helpful response of the Osgoode Hall L. J. to the sub-
mission of this paper.
* M. T. MacCrimmon is an Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of
British Columbia.
" W. T. Stanbury is an Associate Professor of Policy Analysis, Faculty of Com-
merce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia.
I Proposals for Change, Fourteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Finance,
Trade and Economic Affairs Respecting Stage II Competition Policy (Ottawa: Supply
and Services, 1977).
2 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Proposals for a New Competition
Policy for Canada, Second Stage (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1977). A useful sum-
mary of Bill C-42 can be found in Martin J. Rochwerg, Proposed Stage H1 Amendments
to Canadian Combines Legislation - Bill C-42 (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall L. J. 51.
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Competition Act will be enforced. The proposed amendments to the substan-
tive sections are, in our view, much less significant than those dealing with
administration and enforcement.
B. BACKGROUND TO THE COMMITTEE'S REPORTs
The reform of Canadian competition policy has been over a decade in
the making. In mid-1966 the federal government requested the Economic
Council of Canada to prepare a report on "combines, mergers, monopolies
and restraint of trade." 4 Three years later the Council published its Interim
Report on Competition Policy5 which proposed, among other things, that
the exclusive reliance on the criminal law be sharply reduced and replaced
by civil procedures. Two years later, the Minister of Consumer and Cor-
porate Affairs, Ron Basford, introduced the ill-fated Competition Act of
1971.6 Fierce opposition from business resulted in the reforms being divided
into two stages.7 Stage I was placed before Parliament in November 1973, 8
and after substantial amendment reflecting business pressure, became effec-
tive in 1976.9 In the spring of 1975 the Department of Consumer and Cor-
porate Affairs requested L. A. Skeoch of Queen's University to chair a
committee to prepare a report with recommendations for the second stage.
The Skeoch report was released on May 31, 1976.10 Nine months later,
Anthony Abbott, the eighth Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in
A more extensive discussion is found in W. T. Stanbury, Business Interests and
the Reform of Canadian Competition Policy, 1971-1975 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen,
1977).
4 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1969) at 1.
5 Id.
6Bill C-256 (1971) The Competition Act, first reading June 29, 1971. See also
The Competition Act: Explanatory Notes (Department of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, 1971) (mimeo).
7 Stanbury, supra, note 3 at 95-131.
8 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Proposals for a New Competition
Policy for Canada, First Stage (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1973).
9 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, amended by c. 10 (1st Supp.),
c. 10 (2nd Supp.), 1974-75-76, c. 76. The amendments came into effect on January 1,
1976; however, the application of the Act to services became effective July 1, 1976.
.o L. A. Skeoch et al., Dynamic Change and Accountability in a Canadian Market
Economy (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976). This report is reviewed in W. T.
Stanbury, Dynamic Change and Accountability in a Canadian Market Economy: Sum-
mary and Critique (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall L. J. 1. At the same time, the Department
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs released a number of other studies prepared for the
Stage I1 amendments: Neil J. Williams, "Damages Class Action Under the Combines
Investigation Act" in A Proposal for Class Actions Under Competition Policy Legislation
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976); (see also Neil J. Williams, Consumer Class Ac.
tions in Canada - Some Proposals for Reform (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.)
Jennifer Whybrow, 'The Case for Class Actions in Canadian Competition Policy: An
Economist's Viewpoint" in A Proposal for Class Actions Under Competition Policy
Legislation, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976) at 196. M. J. Trebilcock, et al.,
Proposed Policy Directions for the Reform of the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices
in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976); R. I. Cohen and J. S. Ziegel, The
Political and Constitutional Basis for a New Trade Practices Act (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1976); C. D. Edwards, et al., Studies of Foreign Competition Policy and Prac-
tice (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976).
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ten years, presented Bill C-42, the Stage H1 amendments to the Combines
Investigation Act, to the House of Commons. Shortly thereafter, the bill was
withdrawn from the Order Paper and referred to the Standing Committee on
Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs chaired by Norman Caftik. The Com-
mittee held hearings during June 1977, and received briefs and heard testi-
mony from thirty-eight groups or individuals. Another 109 briefs were received
by the Committee.' In comparison, for the Stage I amendments, the Commit-
tee heard testimony from only sixteen organizations and received briefs from
another eighty-two.' 2
Few briefs supported Bill C-42.13 One reporter summarized the situation
as follows: "The business community has presented a well-co-ordinated and
solid front, through lobbying and briefs, on the issue of competition policy.' 14
After endorsing the virtues of a competition policy, the typical brief from
individual firms and trade organizations often proposed the elimination of
key sections or a severe reduction of their effectiveness. Senior civil servants
of the Bureau of Competition Policy, present throughout the hearings, 15 ex-
plained the policy and sought to correct many of the errors, misperceptions
and overstatements contained in a good number of the briefs. 16 In the end,
as indicated in its report of August 5, 1977, the Committee evidently found
some of the arguments of business, particularly with respect to administration
of the expanded civil provisions, persuasive. At the same time, it appears
that the Committee was less influenced by business representations con-
cerning the substantive sections dealing with mergers, monopoly, joint mo-
nopolization, 17 price differentiation, interloeldng directorates, specialization
"Our analysis of the 147 briefs (38 of which were accompanied by testimony
before the Committee) indicates the following distribution by source: individual business
firms (43), trade organizations (38), farm organizations (12), marketing boards (22),
academics (8), provincial governments or their departments (6), individuals (8), law-
yers/Canadian Bar Association (5), consumer organizations (2), union/Canadian La-
bour Congress (2) and other (1). The briefs from farm organizations, marketing
boards and provincial governments were almost exclusively devoted to objections to
s. 4.5, 4.6 and 27.1 of Bill C-42. These sections deal with regulated conduct, the condi-
tions for the exemption of federal and provincial marketing boards, and the power of
the Advocate to intervene in federal regulatory proceedings. If these briefs were re-
moved, business briefs accounted for 81 of the 107 remaining. With the exception of
the Canadian Bar Association's brief, the other four from lawyers should be classified
as "business briefs."
12 Stanbury, supra, note 3 at 153.
13 Of those who wrote briefs and appeared before the Committee, strong support
came from the Consumers' Association of Canada, Professors Reschenthaler and Stanbury,
and the National Automotive Trades Association. Qualified support came from the
Canadian Federation of Independent Business.
14 Hugh Nangle, "Competition bill worries enforcers," Ottawa Citizen, August 15,
1977, at 23.
15 The Committee officially invited the civil servants to be present throughout the
the hearings. This was not done during Stage I hearings although the officials accom-
panied the Minister when he testified and testified when questions were referred to them.
16 See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Finance,
Trade and Economic Affairs (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, June 2, 7-9, 14-16, 21-23, 27-30,
1977).17 The one reviewable matter most strongly criticized by business was s. 31.73, joint
monopolization. The Committee's two recommendations would make only a modest
change in the section (Proposals, supra, note 1 at 64).
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agreements, and class actions.' 8 Perhaps the Committee adopted this strategy
because changes in the substantive sections would be more noticeable, while
those dealing with administration and enforcement would be less obvious -
except to the combines cognoscenti in business and academia. The result is
that the Committee's ninety-four recommendations can be trumpeted as both
retaining the key civil and criminal offence sections essentially as drafted in Bill
C-42 and as offering "improvements" in their administration and enforce-
ment.
In a story published one day after the report was released, the Toronto
Star quoted Norman Cafik, Chairman of the Committee, as saying that its
recommendations "substantially change the thrust" of the bill and as such
will ensure its speedy passage in Parliament."9 One day before it was released,
he is quoted as saying "the main thrust of the legislation will not be altered.
We are determined to come up with a meaningful and effective competition
policy."20 The restrictions on enforcement of the civil provisions, however,
will effectively nullify the words of the statute as they relate to the civil re-
viewable matters.21 Shortly after the report was released, one reporter noted:
Consumer and corporate affairs officials believe such changes would essentially
undermine the thrust of the legislation and emasculate the role of the competition
policy advocate.22
If the Committee's recommendations with respect to the enforcement
of civil provisions are adopted, Canada will have strong statutory language
and little or no public civil jurisprudence.
C. ENFORCEMENT: BILL C-42
The potential impact of the Committee's recommendations can be seen
by comparing Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 describes the administration and
enforcement procedures for the civil provisions (Part IV.A) of Bill C-42.
Figure 2 embodies the procedures recommended by the House Committee.
18 If adopted, the Committee's recommendations will make it more difficult for
consumers (or a group of businesses) to launch a class action (Proposals, supra, note 1
at 86-88). However, substitute actions conducted by the Advocate, which were strongly
criticized by business, remain with the proviso that they should proceed only where the
damages awarded may reasonably be expected to become available to some or all mem-
bers of the class. (Proposals, supra, note 1 at 90).
19 Stephen Handelman, "Competition bill needs softening committee says," Toronto
Star, August 6, 1977, at A3.
20 "Business Groups Call for Changes," Toronto Star, August 4, 1977, at B7.
21 The Stage I legislation defined the following as civil reviewable matters: refusal
to supply, consignment selling, exclusive dealing, market restriction, tied selling, foreignjudgments and foreign laws and directives. Bill C-42 added the following: mergers,
monopoly (also a criminal offence), joint monopolization, interlocking directorates,
abuse of intellectual property rights, restrictions on imports or exports, and price differ-
entiation. To this list, the House Committee recommends that price discrimination,
currently s. 34(1) (a) of the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 amended
by c. 10 (1st Supp.), c. 10 (2nd Supp.), 1974-75-76, c. 76, be made a reviewable matter
under Part IV.A of the Act. At present, price discrimination is a criminal offence.
2 2 Nangle, supra, note 14 at 23.
[VOL. 15, NO. 2
Legislative Comment
Figure 1
Administration and Enforcement Procedures per Bill C-42, March 1977
(Civil Provisions, Part IV.1 of the Proposed Competition Act)
If formal powers are used,
Insufficient STOP a discontinued inquiry isInvestigation Evidence noted in the Advocate's
Annual Report
Full hearing on the applica-
tion before a panel of 3
members of the Board
Prima facie case -STOP (no appeal)
not shown
- --------------------- I
i While not officially
provided for, the
defendants have an
opportunity to negotiate
a consent order with theI
I Advocate
I
Board grants an Order or No appeal STOP
refuses to grant an Order
Appeal by defendant(s) orAdvocate per S. 28 of the
Federal Court Act
I Uphld ISet aside I
decision the decision
STOP
Advocate required to show a
prima facie case in ex parte
hearing before one member
of Competition Board
1977]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Under section 31.91 of Bill C-42, following his investigation of a re-
viewable matter, the Competition Policy Advocate23 must establish a prima
facie case in an ex parte hearing before a member of the Competition Board.
Should he fail to do so, he can go no further, the Board member's ruling is
not subject to appeal. If he establishes a prima facie case, the Advocate
makes an application for an order to the Competition Board and a full-scale
adversarial hearing is held on the application. The Board operates like a court
(in fact, it is a court of record), but it is an expert, civil tribunal not bound
by any legal or technical rules of evidence 24 although subject to the rules of
natural justice. The Board may grant or refuse to grant the order applied for
by the Advocate. An order of the Board is not subject to appeal, except under
section 28 of the Federal Court Act.25 The importance of this limited right of
appeal is that the Court of Appeal cannot substitute its judgment and/or
remedy for that of the expert, civil tribunal. The Skeoch committee argued
and we would agree that it would "risk defeating the entire purpose of the
specialized Board to permit the courts to substitute their views as to properjudgments concerning facts, market definition or the design of the remedy."203
D. ENFORCEMENT: THE COMM=FTIE'S RECOMMENDATIONS
As illustrated by Figure 2, the Advocate, before he can start to bring
a civil case- before the Board, must obtain the written permission of the
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs for the first three years the Act
is in place. This recommendation is intended to guard against the excessive
powers of the Competition Policy Advocate. 27
The Committee argues that:
... adequate safeguards must be built into the system to ensure that it does not
get out of control due to well intentioned but excessively enthusiastic enforce-
ment.2
8
At the same time, the Committee correctly pointed out:
It appears that what are perceived [by business] as expanded powers of the Corn-
2 The Advocate is the new name for the current Director of Investigation and
Research, Combines Investigation Act.
24 See s. 31.8 of Bill C-42.
25 Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.) 28.(1) "Notwithstanding section
18 or the provisions of any other Act, the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and
determine an application to review and set aside a decision or order, other than a deci-
sion or order of an administrative nature not required by law to be made on a judicial
or quasi-judicial basis, made by or in the course of proceedings before a federal board,
commission or other tribunal, upon the ground that the board, commission or tribunal
(a) failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused
to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) erred in law in making its decision or order, whether
or not the error appears on the face of the record; or (c) based its decision or order
on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or with-
out regard for the material before it."
26 Skeoch et al., supra, note 10 at 310.
2 7 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 17.
28 Id. at21.
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Figure 2
Administration and Enforcement Procedures per House Committee Report,
August 1977 (Civil Provisions, Part IV.1 of the Proposed Competition Act)
(Key: RIO = Recommendation 10)
If formal powers used, a
STOP discontinued inquiry is noted
in Annual Report
Minister f Consumer and Corporate
R9 Affairs approval (for 3 years after NO-- STOP { no information made
Act comes into force) Iknown to public
Copy of application and all support-I
RIO lng documentatioti for an order todefendants
Ex parae hearing: show ehringNO
R34 before one member parthe Board10- STOP information made public?
per S. 31.91 E
Defendant has 30 days to negotiate[.. ngtalnf| [-""'
Rl a consent order or file written re- n otiationof c fulRIsponse wit h Board Znen or' ] -' fu
R f ite------------uscesu Advocate muse prepare Rt
res onseeconomic impact statement
60 day period to permit 1) written No commen ts or
14 comments by any one, 2) applics- application fortlion for disallowance by person disaplowance f
substantially affected is w
any written comments or applica- R Negotiated orderR6tions for disallowance 15 becomes final SIt T OP
SReview of all documents file d Xby [[
It h member of the Board who[ ppro'elhe pro-
RI6 beard application for the order posed order, it STOP[under S.31.91, gives written ]Ibecomes final
Sreasons [!
Disallows proposid consent ordJ1
Board shall review all documents and "seek resolu- C c 
-SO
R19 lion" of all or some issues i.e. negotiate a consent Consent Order negotiated STOP
11 Full bearing on Advocates application before a pa- Board refuses to grant an order
STOP--FBoard grants an order Cppe pr t of thnctederal
Appeal by "defendants" to the Federal Court of!
R371 Appeal if Order requires dissolution, divestiture or uphold decision set aside
loss of patent etc. rights on both fact and law '
Appeal granted, written I - -
R37 reasons and directionsi ial. . SOP
to Board dsmised SO
further consideration Order affirmed
R37 and determination -STOP
by Board Orderchanged
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petition Policy Advocate really amount to no more than either a codification of
existing, informal practice or a modernization of already extant provisions 20
Despite this acknowledgement, the Committee imposed the requirement of
Ministerial permission even though such permission is not now, and has
never been required.3 0 At present, in criminal cases, the Director of Investi-
gation and Research conducts his investigation and, if on the basis of the
evidence before him, he has reason to believe an offence has been committed,
he prepares a "Summary of Evidence." This document and relevant files are
turned over to the Department of Justice with the recommendation for
prosecution. The Department of Justice may seek an opinion from outside
counsel, but it makes the final decision as to prosecution.31 In the case of
civil reviewable matters, which have only been in the Act since January 1,
1976 and which have not been used to date, the Director submits to the Restric-
tive Trade Practices Commission (RTPC) an application for a remedial or
prohibition order. The application must contain "a list of the pages of tran-
script of oral evidence in an inquiry under the Act, if any, and any other docu-
ments, suitably described, upon which the [Director] relies. 382 Upon request,
the defendant has the right to a copy of these documents and pages of tran-
script. The RTPC holds a full-scale adversarial hearing and either grants or
refuses to grant the order requested.
In essence, the Committee has placed another obstacle before the chief
enforcement officer of competition policy. One problem with the enforcement
of the current statute may be a reluctance to test its limits, and the Com-
mittee's recommendations are likely to aggravate this problem. Between 1889
and 1974/75, the Crown won 82% of the completed combines cases. It won
the same percentage of the 447 misleading advertising cases completed be-
tween 1971/72 and 1975/76.33 Stronger evidence that enforcement has not
been "excessively enthusiastic" is provided by the fact that in the last decade,
in an increasing percentage of cases won by the Crown, the accused has
pleaded guilty or failed to contest an application for a prohibition order
:
29 d. at 38.
30 During the drafting of Bill C-42 there was a debate within the Cabinet and
between the Departments of Justice and Consumer and Corporate Affairs over whether
the Advocate would be required to obtain the Minister's permission to proceed with
both civil and criminal cases.
31 Gorecki and Stanbury note that the slowness with which the Department of
Justice acts in many cases constitutes a "filter" on effective enforcement. See P. K.
Gorecki and W. T. Stanbury, Canada's Combines Investigation Act: The Record of
Public Law Enforcement (paper presented at the National Conference on Competition
Policy, University of Toronto, Toronto, May 12, 13, 1977) (mimeo) at 14.
32 The role of the RTPC following the 1975 amendments is described in J. J.
Quinlan, The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission: Its Functions and Duties (speech
before the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association, Montreal, August
12, 1975) (mimeo); R. S. MacLellan, "The New Quasi-Judicial Powers of the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission Contained in the Proposed Amendments to the Combines
Investigation Act, Bill C-2" in Claude Masse, (ed.), Rapport De La Conftrence Cana-
dienne Sur Le Droit et al Consommation (Montreal: Universit6 de Montreal, 1976) at
243; G. E. Kaiser, The New Competition Law: Stage One (1976), 1 C.B.L.J. 147.
33 Quinlan, id., at 5-9.
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under section 30(2). Gorecki and Stanbury34 indicated that between 1889
and 1947 the defendants contested 90% of all combines cases brought by
the Crown. Between 1948 and 1964/65 this dropped to 52%. In the last
decade (1965/66-1974/75) the defendants only contested the charges in
35% of the increasing number of cases brought by the Crown.35
Table 136
Combines and Misleading Advertising Cases in Canada, 1889-1976/77
Combines Cases Misleading Advertising Cases
Average No. Average No.
Period Total per year Total per year
1889-1910 8 0.4
1911-1921 0 -
1922-1948 16 0.6 not applicable
1949-1955 12 1.7
1956-1960 17 3.4
1960/61-1964/65 18 3.6 15 3.0
1965/66-1969/70 25 5.0 75 15.0
1970/71-1974/75 48 9.6 483 96.6
1975/76-1976/77 29 14.5 225 112.5
The basis for the Committee's concern about "well intentioned but
excessively enthusiastic enforcement" may lie in the significant increase in
combines and misleading advertising prosecutions since World War I. This
is documented in Table 1. Prior to 1949, the Crown did not bring a single case
in forty-three of the sixty years during which this country had an anti-combines
statute. From the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's the number of prosecutions
averaged less than four per year. In the past two years the Crown laid charges
in twenty-nine cases. Despite the increase in the number of prosecutions, there
has never been one substantiated complaint of unjustified prosecution. Where
is the demonstrated need to protect business from overly zealous enforce-
ment?
With respect to its series of recommendations designed to deal with
"well intentioned but excessively enthusiastic enforcement," the Committee
noted that it was drawing upon its own ideas rather than those in the briefs
34 Id. at 7-9 and Table 8.
35 There is an alternative explanation. In view of the low fines imposed in all but
a very few cases, defendants may prefer to plead guilty, pay the small fine and avoid
the large legal costs of an expensive, contested case. See W. T. Stanbury, Penalties and
Remedies Under the Combines Investigation Act, 1889-1976 (1976), 14 Osgoode Hall
L. J. 571.
3 0 Supra, note 31. From 1889 to 1960 the cases are dated by the calendar year of the
trial court's decision; from 1960/61 to 1976/77 cases are dated by the year beginning
April 1 in which charges are laid.
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and testimony it received. It said, ". . . the Committee's response may to
some take a surprising turn in that no specific recommendation was made
along the lines of the new approach that the Committee has adopted. ' '37
The Committee recommends that Ministerial approval to launch a civil
reviewable matter be required for only the first three years. Presumably, by
that time the Advocate will be sufficiently politically sensitive that more overt
control will be unnecessary. The recommended procedure invites big business
and their legal counsel to put pressure on the Minister to accommodate their
interests. The problem is compounded by the secrecy of the Minister's deci-
sions. The Committee does not recommend that the Minister be required to
give reasons for refusing the Advocate permission to proceed. Since most
investigations are conducted in secret (unless the firm(s) make a public
statement), the public will never know when the Minister has refused the
Advocate permission to proceed. How is the public's interest in an effective
competition policy to be protected from the Minister's interest in "getting
along" with business?
Before he can proceed to the ex parte hearing before a member of the
Board under section 31.91, the Advocate must "serve upon each person
against whom [he] is seeking an order or recommendation from the Board
a copy of the application and all supporting documentation to be used on
the ex parte application. '8 8 This is a partial substitute for a full examination
for discovery. The Skeoch report pointed out that "[i]n matters as complex
as are involved in this field, pre-hearing definition of the issues, and organi-
zation and exchange of evidence, can be fundamental requirements of effi-
cient and fair hearings."89 Presumably the Board will make provision for oral
examinations for discovery by the defendant.
Recommendation 34 of the Committee increases the burden of proof
required of the Advocate at the ex parte hearing. Referring to section 31.91,
Norman Cafik, Chairman of the Committee, said, "We've amended that, I
think significantly, with one word. [The Advocate has] got to make a strong
prima facie case before the board. '40 Unfortunately, the Committee does not
explain what is meant by a "strong" prima facie case, but is content with
saying "a strengthening of this onus could well enforce the objectives of the
section" (section 31.91).41 What is a "strong" prima facie case? Although the
Committee complained along with many of the business briefs that the new
terminology embodied in Bill C-42 increases uncertainty for those subject to it,
it has compounded the uncertainty by creating a new term of its own.
In introducing its recommendations on enforcement, the Committee
couched them in terms of the need to "maximize the possibility of achiev-
3 7 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 21.
8 Id. at 25. For convenience we use the term defendant(s) to denote the person(s)
against whom the Advocate is seeking an order.
39 Skeoch et al., supra, note 10 at 304.
40 Radio Station CJOH, "Committee Recommends Complete Overhaul of Com-
petition Bill," Newsline, 6:00 p.m. August 5, 1977.
41 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 41.
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ing .. .voluntary compliance" and in terms of minimizing "interminable
delays" so as to achieve "expeditious application of competition law in
Canada." 2 In particular, it wanted to reduce "constant confrontation" and
provide an "impartial statutory frame-work" for voluntary compliance.
43
Recommendations 11 and 19 formally introduce bargaining into the
enforcement procedures. If the Advocate establishes a "strong" prima facie
case under section 31.91, Recommendation 11 provides that the defendants
will have thirty days in which to attempt to negotiate a consent order with
the Advocate. If a consent order cannot be negotiated 44 with the Advocate,
Recommendation 19 provides "that the Competition Board shall review with
the parties all documents filed with it and seek to obtain a resolution of all
or some of the issues before it before proceeding to hear the application."45;
What was to be a highly qualified, impartial civil tribunal is now to act as a
mediator between the Advocate and those against whom he is seeking an
order. If its mediation efforts fail, the Board may later be required to revert
to its judicial role and conduct a full-scale adversarial hearing on the matter.
The institutionalization of "enforcement by bargaining," as proposed by
the Committee, particularly in respect to the dual role of the Competition
Board as both mediator and adjudicator, is most undesirable. The Skeoch
report emphasized that, "[e]very reasonable step should be taken to ensure
both the fact and the appearance of an independent and impartial adjudica-
tor."46 The whole thrust of the Skeoch report, of Bill C-42, and of many
of the business briefs submitted to the Committee, was to ensure the compe-
tence and impartiality of the Board. It appears that the members of the
Board who, under Recommendation 19, "seek to obtain a resolution of all
or some of the issues before it. .... ,,47 (i.e. act as mediators), sit as adjudica-
tors in the full-scale hearing on the Advocate's application for an order.
This conflict of roles is inconsistent with the widely-shared perception of the
Board's role as an adjudicatory body. It is also inconsistent with independent
and impartial adjudication.
Perhaps in recognition of their dual roles, the Committee has changed
its view on the qualifications of the members of the Board. Throughout the
hearings, the Committee members emphasized the high calibre of persons to
be appointed, i.e. they were to be distinguished in their field, impartial and
knowledgeable in law, economics, business or public affairs. In Recommen-
dation 36, the Committee has emphasized the need for "practical knowledge
and training" in these fields. 48
42 Id. at 16-17.
43 Id. at 24.
44 The wording of R 11 is at best obscure - does a defendant who is unsuccessful
in his attempt to negotiate have the right to file reasons with the Board? The wording
is in the alternative: The defendant has 30 days "to conclude a proposed consent order
with the Competition Policy Advocate or, alternatively, file with the Competition Board
a written response ...." (Proposals, supra, note 1 at 26.)
4 5 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 28.
40 Skeoch et al., supra, note 10 at 289.
47 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 28.
48 Id. at 44.
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Recommendation 13 provides that should a consent order be negotiated
between the Advocate and the defendant(s), the Advocate must file a copy
of the proposed order, a short description of it and an "'economic impact
statement' setting forth a brief statement of the costs and benefits of the
proposed order. . ." with the Board.49 This idea was not suggested by any
one of the first 100 or so briefs submitted which the authors examined. In
practical terms, particularly in view of the time constraint, such a benefit-cost
analysis is at best speculative. At the worst, it may be totally misleading.
This recommendation is merely fashionable jargon devoid of practicality and
substance.
Recommendation 14 provides that within sixty days any person can file
with the Board written comments on the order and any person ("consumer,
producer or otherwise") substantially affected by the proposed order can file
an "application for disallowance."50 These provisions would appear to have
been borrowed from the U.S. Department of Justice treatment of consent
decrees.51 If an application for disallowance or any written comments have
been filed with the Board, Recommendation 16 provides that all of the docu-
ments are then reviewed by the member of the Board who heard the applica-
tion at the ex parte hearing. This member may or may not approve the pro-
posed order and must give written reasons for his decision. While this must be
done within sixty days of the filing of the proposed consent order, it adds one
more step to the procedure and one more barrier which must be overcome
before the Advocate can obtain a full hearing before a three member panel
of the Board. What is more, it creates a situation where a single member
of the Board, by approving a proposed consent order, has the power to set
policy for the entire Board. Since such remedial or prohibition orders are the
sole public remedy available under the civil procedures (Part IV.1 of the
Act), it is not desirable that this power should reside in a single member.
As indicated in Figure 2, the Board, before holding a hearing, enters
the process following one of three occurrences:5 2 (1) if the defendant has
filed a written response in the thirty day period after the Advocate has shown
a "strong" prima facie case; (2) after the defendant has tried unsuccessfully
to negotiate a consent order with the Advocate; or (3) after a proposed
consent order has been disallowed by a member of the Board. It appears,
although not clearly specified by the Committee, that if the Board negotiates
a consent order it is not subject to the procedures set out by Recommenda-
tions 13 to 16. It is also unclear whether a "consent order" is an order within
the meaning of section 31.1 (1) of the present Act, which provides that a per-
son who has suffered loss or damage as the result of "the failure of any person
to comply with the order of the Board" may recover damages in a private
49 Id. at 26.
50 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 26. The purpose of the requirement that an application
for disallowance can only be filed by a person substantially affected is not clear since
a Board Member must review the proposed order if there are written comments by "any
person" or if there is an application for disallowance.51 Mark J. Green et al., The Closed Enterprise System (New York: Bantam Books,
1972) Chapter 6.
52 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 26-28.
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action. If a consent order is not negotiated with the aid of the Board it is
finally possible to hold a full-scale hearing before the Board.
The House Committee argues that the procedures outlined to this point
"have important merits:
first, they do not require the creation of any new layer of administrative machin-
ery; second, they permit voluntary compliance against the back drop of interpreta-
tive rulings53 and Competition Board decisions thus mitigating against over-reach
on either side; and thirdly, they allow the public to have a 'check' on the whole
process.5 4
The first and last claims are the most exaggerated. Anyone who, after looking
closely at Figure 2 (what the Committee recommends) and comparing it
with Figure 1 (what is proposed in Bill C-42) can say no new layer of ad-
ministrative machinery has been added is confusing form with substance.
More layers of procedure have been added than Salem6 had veils! How does
the public have much of a "check" on these procedures? The Committee does
not indicate that if the Board negotiates a consent order under Recommenda-
tion 19, such an order will be subject to either written comments from the
public and/or an "application for disallowance." If such a procedure were
followed, there is the possibility of a single Board member overruling the
Board members who assisted in the negotiations. In most cases, the activities
of regulatory agencies are little publicized. How will those affected by a
proposed order know of it so as to be in a position to challenge it? Who will
pay for their intervention? Why should interventions be limited (apparently)
to a written submission? With the exception of larger businesses directly
affected by a proposed order, we doubt that broader consumer interests will
53 In accord with the Committee's belief that competition policy and its enforcers
"should endeavour to provide explicit and intelligible guidance ... as to what are
considered unacceptable methods of competition and deceptive practices .... " it pro-
poses that the Competition Board "be empowered to issue 'interpretative rulings' in
regard to any section of the Competition Act pursuant to which the Board can make an
order or recommendation." (Proposals, supra, note 1 at 22). Such rulings could be
initiated by the Board, by the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and at the
written request of any other person. Before an interpretative ruling is made final, the
Board would publish a preliminary draft and for a period of 90 days it would receive
written representations "from all concerned parties" and may change the ruling before
it becomes final. Once published in final form the ruling "would be legally binding on
the Board until such time as the Board might consider it necessary to rescind or revise
it" (Proposals, supra, note 1 at 22). However, the Board would not be compelled to
issue a ruling following every request, nor would it be required to rule on specific mat-
ters, "the full facts in respect to which might not be available to it" (Proposals, supra,
note I at 22). The details are contained in Recommendations 4 through 8 in the Com-
mittee's report (Proposals, supra, note 1 at 23-24).
It is regrettable that the Committee did not heed the injunctions of the Skeoch
report: "The specialized body we propose is a substitute for the regular courts and is
not a regulatory agency in the American tradition of having legislative, adjudicative and
executive functions rolled into one and the same body such as is the case for example
with the Federal Trade Commission. Accordingly, we propose that the Board not have
the power (to, inter alia] ... engage in general rule making. . . ." (Skeoch et al., supra,
note 10 at 299). We see little difference between interpretative rulings, divorced from
the facts of specific cases, and the type of general rulemaking Skeoch has warned against.
54 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 25.
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be able to challenge undesirable orders. Such challenges are public goods
in the technical sense, and without government financial support for con-
sumer interventions they will be rare. 55 The public "check" on negotiated
consent orders is only superficially attractive; it offers little to Canadians
more concerned with inadequate rather than overly aggressive enforcement.
E. APPEAL PROCEDURES RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE
Following its hearing on the Advocate's application for a remedial or
prohibition order, the Competition Board may or may not grant an order.
If it refuses to do so, the Advocate may appeal, but only under section 28 of the
Federal Court Act the provisions of which have been described above. If the
Board grants an order, the defendant(s) may appeal, under section 28; alterna-
tively under the Committee's Recommendation 37, they wiU have an absolute
right of appeal on questions of both fact and law to the Federal Court of Ap-
peal. This right follows any order requiring: (1) the dissolution of a merger or
the disposition of assets under section 31.71; (2) the dissolution of a "monopo-
ly" or a divestiture of assets under section 31.72 or section 31.73; or (3) the
granting of a patent, trademark, copyright or industrial design licence or
the expungement of a trademark, copyright or industrial design under section
31.74.56 Such an appeal was not permitted under Bill C-42.
Virtually every business brief supported an absolute right of appeal,
particularly in cases where structural remedies were to be imposed. Many
also supported a Cabinet power to override, whether in lieu of appeal to the
courts or in addition to it. Fortunately, the Committee eschewed the over-
ride. It also wisely limited the ability of the appeal court, in the event it
allows an appeal, "to direct the matter back to the Competition Board for
further consideration and determination, either generally or in respect of a
specified matter." 57 It is not entitled to substitute its decision for that of the
Board. The Committee continued, "In so directing the matter back, the Court
of Appeal should be required to advise the Competition Board of its reasons
and to give it such directions as are considered appropriate to the recon-
sideration." 58 It should be noted that the Committee recommends a limited
form of appeal. First, it can only be invoked where structural remedies are
ordered. Second, the Court of Appeal cannot substitute its own judgment on
the facts and in regard to the remedy. It can only return the case to the
Board for reconsideration.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The administrative process recommended by the Committee could well
result in "soft" remedies and insufficient protection for the public for a
number of reasons:
55 Stanbury, supra, note 3 at 30-32.
56 Proposals, supra, note 1 at 44-45.
57 Id. at 45.
58 Id. at 45.
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(1) Politically sensitive cases may never be brought before the Board. If the
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs wishes to be tolerated by
the corporate community, he will see that they do not get beyond the
investigative stage.
(2) The Advocate has a limited senior staff capable of negotiating effective
consent orders within the time constraints the Committee recommends.
Given the generally unsupportive climate in which Canadian competi-
tion policy operates, the result may be weak consent orders.
(3) Under the Committee's recommendations, the Advocate is forced to
negotiate. If the Advocate is reluctant, because of a lack of qualified
senior personnel,59 to engage in comprehensive negotiations in the stages
preceding the full hearing before the Board, the Board may perceive the
Advocate as failing to fulfill his responsibilities within the "less con-
frontation" approach proposed by the Committee. As a result, they may
tend to see the business defendants in a more favourable light in decid-
ing on the Advocate's application for an order.
(4) Placing the Board in the dual role of mediator and adjudicator will in-
crease the possibility of political influence, undermine the fairness of
the hearing and defeat the objectives60 of the Act. The Skeoch report
concluded that the success of the legislation in achieving "reasonable
decisions in specific situations" was critically dependent "upon the
existence of a decision-making authority capable of dealing perceptively
and impartially on a case-by-case basis with the complex questions of
fact and remedy .... 61
The "bargaining/negotiating" approach of the House Committee reflects
an unwarranted fear of the overt determination of the conflict between the
private interests of business enterprise and the larger public interest. It is time
we liberated ourselves from the ghost of Mackenzie King, who in speaking of
the Combines Investigation Act of 1910, said, "I would like the House to
understand that in introducing this legislation no attempt is being made to
59 The Advocate may be required to use staff lawyers from the Department of
Justice to handle his cases beyond the ex parte hearing.
60 The preamble of the current Combines Investigation Act (supra, note 9) states
that it is an "[aict to provide for the investigation of combines, monopolies, trusts and
mergers." In contrast, the preamble to Bill C-42 provides inter alia that its purpose is
to "provide for the general regulation of trade and commerce by promoting competition
and the integrity of the market place. . . ." The national interest and the interest of
individual Canadians will be promoted by "an economic environment that is conducive
to the efficient allocation ... of resources, stimulates innovation ... , expands oppor-
tunities" in domestic and export markets, and "encourages the transmission of those
benefits to society in an equitable manner." A requisite condition to achieving this pur-
pose is the "creation and maintenance of a flexible, adaptable... Canadian economy that
will facilitate the movement of... resources .... reduce or remove barriers to such
mobility," and "protect freedom of economic opportunity ... by discouraging unneces-
sary concentration and the predatory exercise of economic power.... " "[Sluch a market
economy may only be ensured through the recognition and encouragement of the role
of competition in the Canadian economy...."
61 Skeoch et al., supra, note 10 at 279 (emphasis added).
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legislate against combines, mergers and trusts as such...."0 2 It is necessary
(if not sufficient) to legislate against the untoward effects of combines,
mergers, and joint monopoly power and to make the necessary hard decisions
when the interests of firms conflict with those of consumers.
If both the public and the firms involved are to have confidence in the
civil procedures embodied in the Competition Act, it is essential that the role
of the Board be restricted to that of an impartial, expert adjudicatory body.
In the case of very significant new legislation it is imperative that we obtain
clearly-articulated interpretations of the statute rather than see public policy
made implicitly, largely by bargaining.6
Until a serious case, one with hard evidence of abuse of power, can be
made for restricting the ability of the Advocate to bring civil cases before
the Competition Board, the requirement of obtaining the permission of the
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs should not be enacted. It is an
invitation to the worst form of political control of competition policy. It will
be a policy conducted in secret, subject to the pressures of the firms under
investigation, and not subject to the scrutiny of the general public.
62 Canada: House of Commons Debates, 1909-10 at 6803. Cited in L. A. Skeoch,
(ed.), Restrictive Trade Practices in Canada (Toronto: MeClelland and Stewart, 1966)
at 23-24.
03 See supra, note 53 for a discussion of the authority of the Board to issue interpre-
tative rulings.
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